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Abstract
The quiet evolution of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper)
into a de facto decision-making body has received surprisingly little attention by
integration researchers. Even less attention has been paid to the novel institu-
tional form and underlying rationality of this forum at the interface between the
national and Community levels. Based on extensive semi-structured interviews
with members of the Brussels’ permanent representations, this essay examines
how Coreper maintains the performance and output of the Council through the
production of a distinct culture of compromise and community-method. The re-
sult, empirically demonstrated in case studies of the 1994 local elections directive
and of the 1996 Helms-Burton countermeasures, is a shared commitment to
finding solutions, where membership in the collective decision-making process
has become part of the rational calculus of defining and defending self-interests.
These findings suggest the need to modify the instrumentalist, ‘hard bargaining’
image of EU decision-making.
Zusammenfassung
Wissenschaftler, die sich mit der europäischen Integration befassen, haben der
Tatsache, daß sich der Ausschuß der Ständigen Vertreter (COREPER) in aller
Stille zu einem De-facto-Entscheidungsgremium entwickelt hat, erstaunlich we-
nig Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Noch weit weniger Aufmerksamkeit aber wurde
der neuartigen institutionellen Struktur, der ganz eigenen Rationalität dieses Fo-
rums an der Schnittstelle zwischen nationaler und Gemeinschaftsebene zuteil.
Auf der Grundlage von umfangreichen, halbstandardisierten Interviews mit
Mitgliedern der Brüsseler Ständigen Vertretungen untersucht diese Arbeit, wie
COREPER durch die Schaffung einer besonderen Verhandlungskultur die Lei-
stungs- und Entscheidungsfähigkeit des Ministerrates aufrechterhält. In dieser
durch Kompromißbereitschaft und europäisch-supranationale Orientierung ge-
prägten Kultur entwickeln die Mitglieder einen gemeinsamen Willen, Lösungen
zu finden, wobei die Mitgliedschaft in diesem Entscheidungsgremium zu einem
Bestandteil des rationalen Kalküls der Definition und Verteidigung eigener In-
teressen geworden ist. Fallstudien zur 1994 verabschiedeten EG-Richtlinie zu
Kommunalwahlen sowie zu den Gegenmaßnahmen zum Helms-Burton-Gesetz
von 1996 belegen diese Entwicklung empirisch. Im Licht der gefundenen Ergeb-
nisse scheint das Bild vom durch instrumentalistisches, zähes Bargaining be-
stimmten Entscheidungsprozeß in der EU korrigiert werden zu müssen.
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1 Introduction: Two Images of EU Decision-Making
There are two distinct images of decision-making in the European Union (EU). In
the first, actors are self-interest maximizers, preferences are ordered and fixed,
and outcomes are determined by relative power and strategic rationality. Interest
calculations are utilitarian and informed by domestic politics and the constella-
tion of sectoral demands from major producer and consumer groups. Decision-
making styles are attributed to the shadow of the vote or veto and the relative
intensity of preferences, with a tendency towards lowest common denominator
agreements. Size matters; bargaining outcomes tend to converge around the large
state preferences of Germany, France, and Britain. Side payments and package
deals balance winners and losers when such calculations can be horse-traded,
aided by factors such as differential preference intensities across issue-areas.
Ministerial meetings are second in importance only to the grand intergovern-
mental bargains and biannual summitry which set the pace and parameters of
integration. The process of ‘everyday’ Brussels business and the national repre-
sentatives working lower down the decisional hierarchy are less important for as-
sumptional reasons of parsimony as well as purported influence. In this inter-
governmentalist image of the Council, the logic of collective decision-making and
the context of interaction may be influenced by the ‘shadow of the future,’ the
threat of exclusion, or reputational concerns – but factors such as the habits of co-
operation and the long-term accumulation of collective sets of norms, under-
standings, and values are considered “lubricants” to the process, epiphenominal
or anomalous in the causal sequence.
In the second, power and self-interest also matter, but these factors alone are in-
sufficient to understand bargaining outcomes. This image of EU decision-making
takes its cues from a sociological institutionalist perspective (Katzenstein 1996;
Legro 1997; Finnemore 1996). According to this view, interests and preferences
are not exogenously given, but constructed through processes of social interac-
tion (Wendt 1994), which in this case includes the context of interaction at the EU-
level. As a result, communicative rationality is at least as important as instru-
mental rationality in this approach (Risse-Kappen 1996; Kratochwil 1993;
Dierickx/Beyers 1995). Styles of decision-making and “the instinctive recourse to
behave consensually are as important as the formal availability of a decision-rule
permitting qualified majority voting” (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995: 565).
                                                  
Field research for this project was facilitated by financial support from the Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies and a Dissertation Fellowship from the European
Community Studies Association, both of which I gratefully acknowledge. For their
comments on earlier versions, I thank Mark Pollack, Wolfgang Streeck, Leon Lindberg,
John Ruggie, Michael Barnett, Volker Leib, and Susanne Schmidt.
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Ministerial meetings and the high politics of Council summits are only the apex
of a much larger collective decision-making system, including the Committee of
Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and the over two hundred working-groups
which account for the lion’s share of ‘everyday’ Brussels business.
This image insists there are two crucial components rationalist approaches over-
look or discard a priori. As Peter Katzenstein (1996) argues, this includes the cul-
tural-institutional context of policy-making on the one hand, and the constructed
identity of actors on the other (4). This image also draws analytical leverage from
the ‘return of the state’ literature such as Rueschemeyer and Evans’ (1985) insight
that:
Goals, priorities, and commitments – the elements of action that function as ref-
erence points in the rational calculus and thus tend to be taken for granted in
utilitarian analysis – are reshaped in effective processes of institution building
and collectivity formation, at least for the pivotal sets of actors.
(Rueschemeyer/Evans 1985: 72)
Thus the epistemological concerns of this alternative image of the Council focus
on actor socialization, the processes of collective rationality formation, and what
Kreps (1990) has described as a “corporate culture.” This includes the formation
of collective templates, cognitive maps and the ‘frames of meaning’ which guide
and inform human behavior (Hall/Taylor 1996: 14–17; Ruggie 1993: 157–160).
Why is this debate important? Put simply, there is growing attention to the dis-
juncture between competing theoretical images of the Council measured against
“the empirical reality of European decision-making” (Van Schendelen 1996: 532;
Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997). And the debate over different images of EU de-
cision-making is an empirically tractable ‘laboratory’ to test competing theories of
European integration. It is my contention that the explanatory power of the par-
simonious intergovernmentalist image becomes significantly qualified when one
examines the complexities of EU decision-making in closer detail. Examining the
processual and informal attributes of EU decision-making can shed new insights
on the institutional problem-solving capacities of the EU system. The remainder
of this essay explores this alternative image of Council decision-making and
summarizes the main findings from two case studies extracted from an ongoing
research project of Coreper’s role in the EU system.
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2 Coreper in the EU System
2.1 A Novel Representational Form
At first glance, Coreper appears to be one of the modern world’s more arcane in-
ternational institutions, an opaque and secretive talking-shop of diplomats who
prepare ministerial meetings of the Council. Upon closer examination, Coreper is
a de facto decision-making body at the institutional and cognitive interface be-
tween the national and Community levels. As such, Coreper has evolved into an
important feature in the EU’s unique version of supranationality.1 But Coreper
remains a ‘black-box’ in our theories of EU decision-making. There are partial ex-
ceptions to this point. Recent studies address several features of Coreper’s role in
the EU system (deZwaan 1995; Westlake 1995; Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997;
Hayes-Renshaw 1990; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 1989). And Dinan (1994: 250) for ex-
ample, attributes the relationship between Coreper and the Commission’s secre-
tariat-general as “a key ingredient in the Community’s transformation in the late
1980s and early 1990s”. Even periodic media attention such as Lionel Barber’s
“Men Who Run Europe” article in the Financial Times (March 11–12, 1995), Rory
Watson’s feature in European Voice (May 2–8, 1996), and a recent piece in The
Economist (March 8, 1997) suggests that although Coreper operates outside of the
limelight, there is some recognition of the type of institutional clearing-house this
body signifies in the EU system.
According to Article 151 (TEU), Coreper is “responsible for preparing the work of
the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council.” In hind-
sight, Article 151 is among the more remarkable acts of political empowerment in
the history of the Community/Union. Whether Coreper’s central placement in
the system was a purposive act of institutional innovation or an unintended con-
sequence is open to interpretation. But the quiet evolution of Coreper’s power
and influence in the EU system is one of the least documented institutional de-
velopments in the history of the EU. As Bieber and Palmer (1975: 313) noted, “A
very great deal of completely undefined power has been handed over to the Per-
manent Representatives”. In today’s system, Coreper’s role in maintaining the
Community and Union’s single institutional framework is deeply ingrained in
the EU’s decision-making machinery and interinstitutional balance.2
                                                  
1 Other supranational institutional forms include the German Zollverein and the Euro-
pean Danube Commission. The classic study distinguishing these cases is Hay
(1966). On the Zollverein, see Henderson (1959). On the Danube Commission, see
Chamberlain (1923).
2 William Nicoll, British Deputy Permanent Representative 1977–82, describes this
role as supported by “cast-iron Treaty authority” (1994: 195).
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 98/1
Very briefly, Coreper is the institutional arena of the permanent representations
of the fifteen member-states (ambassadors, deputies, and their staff3). Coreper
meets weekly to prepare each upcoming ministerial meeting. Because of their
workload, weekly sessions last the entire day, often continuing late into the eve-
ning or a second day. Since 1962, Coreper has been bifurcated according to a
functional division of labor. The ambassadors compose Coreper II, and they han-
dle the more sensitive political files, working mainly to prepare the monthly
General Affairs Councils. This also closely involves them in recurrent or on-going
negotiations covering budgetary packages, structural and cohesion funds, acces-
sion, and association agreements to name a few. The deputies make up Coreper I
and preside over the so-called ‘technical’ Councils, including the Environment,
Social Affairs, the Internal Market, Transport, Fisheries, Consumer Protection,
Education, and Culture.4
What is perhaps most striking about the role of Coreper in the EU system is its
development into a de facto decision-making body. A crude indicator is the pro-
lific A-point procedure. A-points are “Agreed points” sent to the ministers en bloc
and passed without discussion as their first item of business. By some counts,
nearly 90 percent of Council decisions are made this way.5 But the 90 percent fig-
ure can easily be misleading, since quantifying A- and B-points requires interpre-
tation (e.g. is the local elections case presented below “really” an A- or B-point?)
and substantive agenda items often have components agreed on at more than one
level (e.g. the Helms-Burton case discussed below).6 However, the image of pro-
posals starting in the working-group, filtering up to Coreper, and once the ‘tech-
nical’ points are boiled off, sent to the ministers for debate and decision is a mis-
nomer. Complicated files are almost invariably shuttled up and down the Coun-
cil hierarchy at least once. The movement of proposals from Coreper to Council
and Council to Coreper has become an essential iteration in the temporal se-
quence of EU decision-making. And the pattern which Noël perceptively ob-
served in 1967, where “the Council prepares the meeting of the Permanent Repre-
                                                  
3 Besides specialists from the line ministries, this includes the Antici counsellors who
prepare Coreper II meetings (named after the inaugural chair of the group started in
1975, Paolo Antici, from the Italian permanent representation) and, since 1993, the
Mertens counsellors providing identical support for Coreper I (named after Vincent
Mertens de Wilmars of the Belgian delegation).
4 Since July 1960, Agriculture has had its own separate preparatory body, the Special
Committee on Agriculture (SCA).
5 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 40) estimate “85–90 per cent of business is trans-
acted by ministers as ‘A’ points, with approximately 70 per cent having been in ef-
fect settled at working group level, and another 15–20 per cent by Coreper, leaving
10–15 per cent to ministers for substantive discussion as ‘B’ points”.
6 For a more systematic breakdown of A- and B-points, see the interesting survey of
Agricultural Councils from 1992 and 1993 by Van Schendelen (1996).
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sentative as much as the latter prepares the Council meeting” (248) has devel-
oped into an almost taken-for-granted trait of the decision-making process.7 Al-
ready at this point the demarcations of de facto versus de jure decision-making
authority within the EU system appear more complex than standard assumptions
imply.
2.2 Wearing a Janus-Face
Any debate over the nature of Council decision-making turns on starting as-
sumptions about the actors who participate in the system, their attitudes, and
their underlying motivations. To understand how the perspective of Committee
members is distinct from the ministerial and expert viewpoints, a fundamental
part of the story is to understand the rationality of the permanent representatives
themselves.
Without exception, the Committee members I spoke to described themselves as
performing a double-role or contradictory functions, even having a “dual per-
sonality,” or as one claimed, “I wear a Janus-face.”8 In Coreper, they are the re-
presentative of their member-state, and in concertation with the capital, perhaps
reporting on a weekly meeting or requesting new instructions, they act as ambas-
sador of the EU to their country.9 This metaphor of the Janus-face goes to the
heart of what Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1995: 564) have described as a “con-
tinuous tension between the home affiliation and the pull of the collective fo-
rum”. Only half-jokingly, the German Ambassador, Dietrich von Kyaw, claims he
is known in Bonn not as the Ständiger Vertreter (Permanent Representative) but
Ständiger Verräter (Permanent Traitor) (Barber 1995).
What is theoretically incisive is the effect of the Janus-face on the day-to-day ar-
ticulation and representation of interests. Coreper is not just an influential group
of diplomats, but an institutional mechanism where member-states internalize
EU membership into their “self” interest calculations. The permanent representa-
tives share a collective rationality based on the dual-responsibility to deliver the
goods both at home and collectively at the EU-level. The defining trait of this ra-
tionality is a redefined notion of self-interest and individual (i.e. statal), instru-
mental rationality. As one deputy in a particularly self-reflective mood explained:
We serve a dialectical function, but it is not contradictory. We play a dialectical
function between the specific interest and the overall perspective. I must do this
                                                  
7 See also Lindberg (1963: 53) and Hayes (1984: 180).
8 Interview, Brussels, February 1996. All interview material quoted below was collected
by the author between February 1996–July 1996 and February 1997–April 1997.
9 Interview with Emile Noël, Paris, March 1996.
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because I am not dealing with one file. There are a succession of games with my
colleagues. We all understand that we must manage and cooperate for the long-
term and this creates an extremely demanding work environment or the system
will not work. The participants have an intrinsic psychological interest in the suc-
cess of the system. But I do not live or feel a contradiction. I feel a tension. This is
not antagonistic, but not unproblematic either when trying to deal with the min-
isters back in [the capital]. This is because there is a confidence that I will deliver
the goods at home and a confidence to deliver the goods collectively. I must find
ways to synthesize the two.10
Delivering the goods at home and collectively, combined with the decisional de-
mands placed on Coreper, creates two features anomalous to the intergovern-
mental image. The first is the system of instruction and way in which the capitals
internalize this dialectic between the self and the collective-self. One ambassador
described his instructions as follows: “I always have two sets of instructions in
front of me. One contain instructions on the specific dossier at hand and the
other, which is unwritten, is a global instruction to find solutions.”11 Existing
principle-agent models would have difficulty diagnosing a form of delegation
that contains a permanent instruction to find solutions with an inbuilt margin for
maneuver. They might object, claiming delegation operates within definable pa-
rameters, but for reasons discussed below, this belies the complexity of instruc-
tion common to the different national systems of coordination.
Second, the dialectic nature of Committee membership and confidence to deliver
on both fronts is rooted in an intangible but collectively held responsibility to
make a success of the Council as a whole. Contrary to the hard bargaining image
of EU decision-making, this can instill a type of self-restraint in “self-interest”
calculations.12 “There is a responsibility to the Community task and narrow na-
tional interests often appear secondary from this perspective,” a former ambas-
sador told me, “Ministers take their interests as the national interest … But we
must wear two hats. We defend national interests and we have a responsibility
vis-à-vis the Community.”13 Another ambassador claimed, “There is a high col-
lective interest in getting results and reaching solutions. This is in addition to rep-
resenting the national interest.”14
In the EU context, Coreper is a mechanism where member-states internalize or
endogenize new ways of articulating, defending, and representing their “self”
interests. As Joseph Weiler (1991: 2479) has so pointedly described, the notion of
“community” in the EU breaks the “exclusivist ethos of statal autonomy.” I can-
                                                  
10 Interview, Brussels, July 1996.
11 Interview, Brussels, February 1996.
12 For a similar argument, see Weiler (1992: 37–38).
13 Interview, national capital, May 1996.
14 Interview, Brussels, July 1996.
Lewis: The Institutional Problem-Solving Capacities of the Council 11
not improve on Weiler’s description of the importance of this development,
namely its “civilizing effect on intra-European statal intercourse” which stems
from the “tension of the state actors among themselves and with their community
and their need to reconcile the reflexes and ethos of the ‘sovereign’ national state
with new modes of discourse and a new discipline of solidarity” (Weiler
1992: 38). A concrete statement reflecting this point is provided by Werner
Ungerer, former German Ambassador (1985–90). Diagnosing the possible effects
of future enlargement and the increased heterogeneity of membership, he points
out that “newcomers … might have difficulties in adapting to the ‘political cul-
ture’ in Brussels where compromise seeking has developed into an art,” and that
this is a culture “which could be qualified as a refined form of defending national
interests” (Ungerer 1993: 82).
In Coreper, this culture of compromise is a by-product of the dual-responsibility
of the Janus-face to deliver on both fronts, and results in a unique perspective,
what Salmon has called the “view d’ensemble” (Salmon 1971: 642; de Zwaan
1995: 34). In perspectival terms, the view d’ensemble is a horizontal viewpoint in
which permanent representatives “see” the broader picture in the interests of
their country. This may include an extended time-horizon (generalized reciproc-
ity), a more inclusive definition of the “national” interest by endogenizing link-
ages to other issue-areas or member-states’ preferences, or just a more-or-less
predictable instinct of what will work and what will not. The latter characteristic
of the view d’ensemble is an outgrowth of the Committee member’s permanent
presence in Brussels and their often long experience in working on European af-
fairs. This also includes a certain institutional memory, an important benefit of
their tenure, which gives the permanent representative the capacity to make ref-
erence to and draw linkages with dossiers from months or years past, to recall
how the insertion or deletion of a sentence or word removed seemingly implaca-
ble legal doubts, even in totally unrelated policy-sectors which share similar legal
reasoning or political maneuver (e.g. packaging a report in a certain manner). In
short, the perspective of the view d’ensemble is a qualitative aspect of the collective
decision-making process found in Coreper, and contributes to the distinct supra-
national institutional form of the EU system.
Coreper also provides a good look at what is often described as a so-called
“Community method” (hereafter, community-method). But the uses and abuses
of notions of a community-method are legion in European integration studies.
Complicating matters are several possible types and sources of a community-
method, including the rotating presidency (often portrayed as a promoter of a
Community perspective), the Commission (as an honest broker and defender of
the “Community interest”), and the Council General-Secretariat (as a neutral ar-
biter and advisor especially through the skills of the legal service). The value-lost
12 MPIfG Discussion Paper 98/1
is that the term community-method has lost all semblance of a meaningful con-
ceptual and empirical indicator of supranationality – something neofunctionalists
tried long ago to establish.
For those who consider the EU a sui generis institutional creature, the strength or
absence of a community-method goes a long way as a conceptual yardstick to
delineate its particular brand of supranationality. My argument is that a commu-
nity-method does exist, it is partially produced and maintained through the in-
stitutional channel of Coreper, and it is the practice of this community-method
which instantiates a form of supranationality distinguishing the EC/EU system
from other multilateral forms of governance, institutions and regimes. The next
section extends this argument by drawing linkages to earlier integration studies
which diagnosed the contours of this emerging community-method.
3 Reconceptualizing the Community-Method
3.1 Missing Ingredients in the Intergovernmentalist Image
Many assume Coreper is an intergovernmental bargaining-table par excellence.
But this misses the underlying rationality and ethos of Coreper as it has evolved
over the last four decades. It also discounts some of the pioneering research on
European integration which recognized Coreper’s emerging institutional form.
Ernst Haas, for example, writing in 1958, identified Cocor (which at the time was
still based out of the national capitals) as “a novel community-type organ” as op-
posed to traditional conference diplomacy (Haas 1985: 491). From his field re-
search conducted between 1959 and 1961, Leon Lindberg also observed the
institutional form of Coreper taking shape:
In their collective role they have become, in effect, an institution of the Commu-
nity … They do not always talk on national briefs, and the common interest of all
in achieving a compromise solution is generally stressed … The Permanent Rep-
resentatives defend national points of view, but at the same time are influenced
by their participation in Community affairs and often argue back to their national
capitals in favor of Commission proposals, or in favor of making concessions to
another Member State in order to achieve agreement. (Lindberg 1963: 78–79)
And as an early insider, Emile Noël stressed the communitaire nature of this cadre
of diplomats:
Coreper could easily turn into a carbon copy of the Council. It has not done so.
The Permanent Representative also represents the Community to his govern-
ment, explains the reasons behind what the Commission is doing, the concerns of
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the other governments and the importance of reaching a conclusion. The Perma-
nent Representatives play this role as individuals, but Coreper as a body can play
a similar role vis-à-vis the Council, putting forward the interests of the Commu-
nity as a whole and ensuring that they prevail. (Noël 1990: 55)
An important focus of neofunctionalism which remains unassimilated in con-
temporary research is their attention to the emergence of a community-method,
including the possibility of actor socialization and the long-term cumulative ef-
fects of EC/EU membership. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), for example,
documented different possibilities of growth inducing coalitions, including the
capacity of actors to “gradually internalize the Community decision-making and
bargaining norms” (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970: 119). Socialization to a commu-
nity-method is the process where actors “learn new rules, develop new identifi-
cations and new patterns of mutual trust and regard” (Lindberg 1970: 98;
1966: 224–225). Borrowing from Rapoport’s classic distinction, the EU’s commu-
nity-method suggests that decision-making less resembles a “fight” or “game”
but a “debate,” where “the models of problem solving, consensus formation, and
communicative action enter as important defining characteristics” (Kratochwil
1993: 448; see also Lindberg 1970: 103).
There is some recognition of the value of this earlier line of questioning. In their
carefully researched volume on the Council, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997:
253–255) ask: “Is there a Community Method?”. They find that “… the neo-
functionalists’ definition of the ‘Community method’ remains apposite for its in-
sights into negotiating behaviour in the EU” (ibid., 254). They go on to add:
There is a shared culture in the Council, in spite of the public and publicised pic-
tures of tensions and antagonistic positioning. Embedded in informal practices,
as well as rooted in formal procedures, this is reinforced by forms of socialisation
and engrenage, much on the line long ago identified by the neo-functionalists …
Our study reveals that decision-makers in the Council, in spite of their national
roots, become locked into the collective process, especially in areas of well-
established and recurrent negotiation. This does not mean that the participants
have transferred loyalties to the EU system, but it does mean that they acknowl-
edge themselves in certain crucial ways as being part of a collective system of de-
cision making. There is an identifiable cohort of decision makers, albeit with pri-
mary affiliations to the member governments, who have specific common con-
cerns and shared commitments to the collective arena. (ibid., 278–279)
Coreper is a mainstay of this shared culture and collective process. My research
supports a characterization of the permanent representatives as a group with
strong identifications of membership in a collective decision-making system. As
such, participation in Coreper represents an important mechanism for socializa-
tion to an EU community-method.
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Another way to conceptualize Coreper’s role in promulgating a community-
method is what Putnam means by the accumulation of “social capital” and the
development of a norm of generalized reciprocity which can “reconcile self-
interest and solidarity” (Putnam 1995: 172). Coreper is an example of a dense net-
work of reciprocal engagement, based on “thick trust” and the production of social
capital. Unlike Putnam’s attention on external sources of social capital (e.g. 169)
which draw on preexisting social connections, the permanent representatives
have created an administrative infrastructure which represents an internal source
of social capital to the EU system. It is in this manner that Coreper functions as a
causal mechanism in the production and maintenance of a community-method.
The accumulation of social capital in Coreper itself has several potential sources
in addition to weekly meetings. The role of trips is one such source, which pre-
cede each European Council summit and are hosted by the presidency in office.
Trips provide interpersonal and social contact and reinforce the bonds of thick
trust. Although business is sometimes discussed informally, trips are more for
socializing, or as an Antici counsellor explained, “The role of trips is an oiling of
the mechanism.”15 Another source of social capital are lunches and restricted ses-
sions where Committee members can speak frankly and in confidence what they
say will not be reported back home. “The really frank discussions take place over
lunch,” a long-time observer revealed, “The real knives only come out on the ta-
ble here. They know what is said will not be reported to headquarters.”16
Coreper’s socialization functions apply to new member-states as well as individ-
ual participants. Alberta Sbragia, for example, has argued the Spanish govern-
ment desired a large Brussels delegation (103 in 1988) because of “the need to ex-
pose its own civil servants as rapidly as possible to the Community’s ways”
(Sbragia 1993: 74).17 Of equal importance is how permanent representatives be-
come socialized into Coreper. An experienced participant told me:
New people at Coreper must find their way. They stick close to their instructions.
They don’t yet have all the technical knowledge of the dossiers. They cannot
gauge what is whispered in their ears. They have to learn to trust their experts.
                                                  
15 Interview, Brussels, April 1997.
16 Interview, Brussels, March 1996. An Antici counsellor told me, “It has happened that
the ambassadors call a restricted meeting to get rid of the experts, even to get the ex-
perts from the permanent representation out! To totally get rid of the watchdog. This
is rare, maybe twice in my eight years here. But when it has happened it is in order
to be able to say what the problem back home is more frankly and to gain a flexibil-
ity of solution including ‘How can I sell this back home?’” (Interview, Brussels,
April 1997).
17 The newest member-states also fit this pattern: Sweden (53 in 1995), Austria (61 in
1995) (Guide to the Council of the European Union, September 1995).
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And only then do they start to operate smoother. This takes at least half a year to
relax and get used to the environment.18
A deputy from one of the newest member-states confirmed this process of so-
cialization:
Early in our membership we acted tough and we had these positions, ‘Others
don’t like it, too bad.’ But the politicians back home learned fast to be prepared to
compromise. Now we are known as a country others can turn to for a compro-
mise.19
A striking illustration of actor socialization is the Belgian Ambassador, Philippe
de Schoutheete, the doyen of Coreper, and described to me by an Antici counsel-
lor of another small member-state as a “master of the process” who has “inter-
nalized the EU more than any other single person.”20 Ambassador de
Schoutheete is also legendary within the Belgian administration for training a
generation of Belgian diplomats and officials to the methods of community. This
reflects over 25 years of work on EC/EU affairs (as Political Director, head of the
P-11 Unit [European Affairs] in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador
since 1987), and includes, according to an official in the Belgian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, “teaching many ministers what the EU is.”21 Similar examples of
permanent representatives with long tenure, experience in European affairs, and
seniority in the national capital could be cited, such as French Ambassador Pierre
de Boissieu (a distant relative of de Gaulle who is often able to win arguments on
intellectual prowess alone), or the German Deputy Jochen Grünhage from the
Ministry of Economics who has held his post since 1987.
Coreper is not the only socialization mechanism to a community-method, but
others, such as the rotating presidency which can be wielded to recalibrate and
rationalize national administrations and train national officials in European pol-
icy-making, are orchestrated through the Brussels-based representation. A mem-
ber of the Dutch delegation claimed their presidency would be used to “reedu-
cate the national administration into Europe, to really go deep; this involves par-
ticipation of some 500 to 600 people.”22 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997) sup-
port this point by arguing:
The permanent representations in Brussels play a particular role here as training-
grounds for national officials, not just in the Council’s working methods and for
forging links with their opposite numbers from other member states, but also for
devising professional responses to this demi-monde between the national and
Community processes. (Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997: 235)
                                                  
18 Interview, Brussels, May 1996.
19 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
20 Interview, Brussels, May 1996.
21 Interview, Brussels, July 1996.
22 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
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Another mechanism is the expansion of Community competencies which forces
member-states to “extend the reach of the socialization process” (Sbragia
1993: 75). Following Maastricht, this process was accelerated or initiated in sev-
eral new issue-areas. “Looking at the beginnings of the third pillar [Justice and
Home Affairs] and the creation of a number of new working groups of coordi-
nators,” an Antici counsellor explained, “it is easy to stress the lack of results to
date … but three years later, you can’t compare how they’ve learned to talk to
one another. This opened their mind to another EU reality.”23
A final mechanism of socialization is the deepening and intensification of na-
tional administrative agents working on European affairs in the home capitals.
This is a kind of ‘dynamic density’ argument which Wolfgang Wessels has esti-
mated to include some 25,000 national officials across the EU (Wessels and
Rometsch 1996: 331; Wessels 1990). Most permanent representatives have years of
experience in European affairs often including previous postings to Brussels (in
some cases as an Antici counsellor or a policy specialist). This reveals that the so-
cialization process embodied in Coreper occurs over an extended time frame, in-
culcated through years of experience, practice, and trust building. We turn now
to the instruction process and some features which suggest the need to relax the
restrictive assumptions of national interest and preference formation found in the
intergovermentalist image.24
3.2 Instructions and the Intergovernmentalist Image
Permanent representatives are under “instruction” from their national capitals.
They are civil servants without authority independent of these instructions. No
Committee member I interviewed failed to offer this point. In theory, this means
for every issue on the agenda they have been given a national position or, at a
minimum, the parameters of what is and is not acceptable. In temporal terms,
this instruction is arrived at only after going through a coordination process in
the national capital among the relevant line ministries, often passing through an
interministerial mechanism (such as the SGCI25 in the French case or the British
Cabinet Office) or through the Foreign Ministry which informally holds coordi-
                                                  
23 Interview, Brussels, May 1996. For an early identification of this socialization mech-
anism, see Haas’ discussion of the concept of “engagement” (Haas 1958: 522–523).
24 The most developed version is Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist
approach. He makes two temporal assumptions which seem particularly restrictive:
(a) “The analysis of national preference formation must precede the analysis of inter-
state bargaining (1993a: 5); and (b) “Governments first define a set of interests, then
bargain among themselves in a effort to realize those interests” (1993b: 481).
25 The full name for this centralized coordinating body is the Secrétariat général du
Comité inter-ministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne.
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nation power.26 And in the case of Denmark, the permanent representative has
received mandation from the Folketing’s European Affairs Committee. In practice
however, there is significant variation from this principle and several layers of
additional complexity which muddy this straightforward temporal sequence.
The margin for maneuver which permanent representatives can acquire varies by
member-state and issue-area. Maneuverability and room for interpretation also
hinges on the personalities involved. Some permanent representatives hold a
great deal of seniority and standing with their ministers and in these cases,
‘voice’ and discretionary maneuver will be greater. And accounting for differ-
ences in the national systems of coordination, instruction, and maneuverability
requires careful empirical study on a case-by-case basis. But one point seems
clear: there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between national instructions
and the representation of interests in Coreper. Most instructions, with the excep-
tion of certain highly sensitive issues which vary by member-state (e.g. transport
for the Netherlands, agriculture for Ireland, Turkey for Greece, the ECJ for Brit-
ain) have an in-built margin for maneuver and are susceptible to evolution. In-
structions which lack an appreciation for evolution and flexibility can be detri-
mental to representatives because discussions and the search for compromise of-
ten evolve over the course of a meeting. This is especially true for issue-areas
where qualified majority voting (and the “shadow of the vote”) applies, since a
delegation can become isolated or left with obsolete arguments to defend.
In general, there are at least four generic patterns which challenge the intergov-
ernmentalist image, including:
1. Departing from instructions and making “recommendations.” When instructions
are “on the wrong track” or others’ arguments are convincing, permanent
representatives can decide to put their instructions aside, give their provi-
sional consent and “recommend” changes back to their national capital. Pro-
visional consent varies by degree of certainty: “I think this can work,” or “I
will try…,” or “I’ll tell them, but… .” More likely, as one deputy commented,
“On a serious piece of legislation, it won’t go through one meeting, but sev-
eral. Here the permanent representative will automatically have ideas to sug-
gest.”27 Departing from instructions is obviously a sensitive interview topic
and specific examples were difficult to document (but see below). Overall,
this pattern points to the neglected role of the power of good arguments and
the importance of communicative rationality.
                                                  
26 For concise summaries of differences in national coordination systems, see Spence
(1995) and Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace (1997: 211–43).
27 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
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2. The national capital signals a margin of maneuver exists. Permanent representa-
tives can be informed more or less explicitly, “not to take instructions too se-
riously,” that they are too complicated, not realistic and so on. This can occur
when national interministerial coordinating mechanisms do not function
properly or in the case of decentralized systems such as Germany, there is
agreement to disagree. One deputy remarked that frequently, “The Minister
will tell me that I am the decision-maker.”28 And, more generally, an ambas-
sador ascribed the flexibility in instruction to the fact that, “They [the capi-
tals] know the system works because there are no spotlights on it.”29 This
practice is similar, in two-level game parlance, to a strategy of “cutting
slack.”30
3. There is a political need to minimize confrontation. This occurs in issue-areas
where the capitals wish to avoid politicization or debate at the ministerial
level. This happens in a variety of ways, either informally by telephone or
formally with an instruction that specifies, “avoid Council.”31 This has oc-
curred in fisheries and the annual negotiations of quotas. Another exemplar
(detailed below) was the 1994 local elections directive where political consen-
sus existed among the capitals to reach agreement in Coreper rather than the
General Affairs Council. In these cases, permanent representatives receive
greater flexibility to find solutions and capacity to sell success at home.
4. The national capital cannot make up its mind. Even the most proficient inter-
ministerial coordinating systems do not always output preferences which are
fixed and ordered. Sometimes, the relevant home ministry will ask their per-
manent representative, “What do you need?”32 In her now-classic study,
Helen Wallace (1973: 65) identified this pattern in citing an official who ac-
knowledged, “Negotiators work best if they write their own instructions.”
More complex, in terms of temporal causation, is the pattern of instruction
which an Antici counsellor described to me as follows: “Instructions already
contain a big Brussels element in them, and sometimes they are Brussels-
instructions, because the first ten lines of our report imply an instruction …
sometimes they just copy our reports into instructions.”33
The role of reporting complicates any parsimonious explanation of the instruc-
tion process. For the permanent representative, reporting is a central channel of
                                                  
28 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
29 Interview, Brussels, July 1996.
30 In this context, permanent representatives are not reformulating national preferences but
reshaping domestic constraints. For more on this strategy, see Moravcsik (1993c: 28).
31 Interview, Brussels, February 1996.
32 Interview, Brussels, April 1996.
33 Interview, Brussels, May 1996.
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voice. Reporting is also a mechanism in the causal chain of interest definition and
redefinition. An Antici counsellor stressed his ambassador often goads his assist-
ants, “If you do such silly reporting, how can you expect to get better instructions
from [the capital]?”34 Another pointed out that “Reports can be written in such a
way as to exert a certain amount of pressure.”35 Even the British, who have ac-
quired a reputation for some of the more rigid and inflexible instructions in re-
cent years, can force London to rethink a position. As a senior member of the
British representation told me, “The permanent representatives’ voice can some-
times produce a paradigm change back home.”36 A recent example of this was
British Ambassador Kerr’s handling of the Delors II package and the budget re-
bate during their last presidency which ultimately saved the UK millions of
pounds, despite initial opposition from London to accept the financial package.
Coreper can also act surreptitiously. Permanent representatives sometimes en-
gage in “plotting.” They can, for example, “especially underline opposition.”37
For instance, in updating the association agreements with Central and Eastern
European countries to account for the Uruguay Round of GATT and the acces-
sion of Sweden, Austria and Finland, agricultural import quotas had to be re-
vised. The German Ambassador was instructed by the Agricultural Ministry to
defend tough restrictions, and despite the trade liberalization arguments from
several other member-states, insisted on maintaining a tough line. But the Ger-
man Ambassador had to weigh this preference with Germany’s overall interests
for Eastern enlargement, and was dissatisfied with this rigid instruction. In Core-
per, the British Ambassador raised a strong objection to the effect that: ‘You are
defending an amount of produce which will fit in the trunk of Dietrich’s Mer-
cedes and we are talking about the future of Europe.’38 The Danish Ambassador
also intervened to argue the German reservation was unacceptable, that the new
quotas amounted to something like half of one potato chip for each German. The
German Ambassador packaged this opposition into his report back to Bonn,
which subsequently changed its position and dropped the reserve. As a member
of the German delegation summarized, “Enlargement interests had to overcome
agricultural reservations.”39
                                                  
34 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
35 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
36 Interview, Brussels, May 1996.
37 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
38 A participant suggested the German and British ambassadors “planned” this inter-
vention beforehand. In any case, the general pattern of bilateral discussions before
and even during Coreper sessions is an important practice, especially the informal
coordination of views with the President. On this point, see de Bassompierre
(1988: 25–29).
39 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
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Plotting and underlining opposition can also involve censure or strong pressure
from the group on a delegation to reconsider their position. A deputy of one of
the newest member-states cited the example of a data protection proposal where
the national position became isolated and Coreper “did not accept our argu-
ment.” As a result, they had to attempt to change the capital’s view, and the dep-
uty was “grateful for their harsh comments [in Coreper], a form of ‘faked out-
rage’ which is a hidden rule of behavior.”40
Another hidden rule of behavior is the ability of permanent representatives to
signal disagreement with their instructions. If they receive a strict instruction, or
in their overall view, an instruction they do not like, there are several ways they
can proceed. “If the capital won’t move, I say this very frankly in Coreper. But I
may say to them, ‘This is my view this week, but it may not be next week.’”41 Or
they may approach the president for an informal bilateral and say, “We must be
tough here, but I promise to discuss with [the capital] for better instructions next
week.”42 Another strategy is to just read them. They may say, “Mr. Chairman, I’d
like to read you something which I myself do not understand,” or “Unfortunately
I have to bore you with the following …”43 Some Committee members claim they
can detect when a colleague is not behind their instructions by body language
alone. A deputy explained:
In these cases, I won’t sound as convincing as usual. The others sense you are not
behind them. Twice I just read them. They were not sensible. I couldn’t just
throw them in the wastebasket, but I could not make an argument with them ei-
ther … when I hear other permanent representatives reading their instructions, I
just let it go, we don’t even start a discussion.44
Occasionally, they may even ‘throw their instructions away.’ This is rare, but two
examples will suggest the general pattern. A Committee member told me:
One time, in the Cultural sector, I fundamentally disagreed with my instructions.
So I made my own proposals and sold them [back home] afterwards. At a re-
stricted Coreper meeting I told the president, “This is my personal opinion and if
we get this compromise I will try to sell it.” I took a risk by making my own pro-
posals, because my instructions said not to do anything.45
In another case, a deputy described going against their instructions on a tele-
communications proposal because the position was indefensible. Specifically:
                                                  
40 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
41 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
42 Interview, Brussels, April 1996.
43 Interviews, Brussels, July 1996 and February 1997.
44 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
45 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
Lewis: The Institutional Problem-Solving Capacities of the Council 21
Sometimes they give me a bad argument to defend. In one case they said place a
reserve because we have a national regulation which we don’t want to change. I
threw this instruction away. I need a good argument …. They said keep the re-
serve because this is technically not possible. So I gave it up. My collaborators
[i.e. assistants] were nervous, they said I can’t do that. I said if the Minister wants
to raise a lot of laughter in the Council, then let him do that I told them. So I
wrote in my report “I let this pass” and explained why.46
Though these cases may occur infrequently, it remains puzzling why permanent
representatives would take such political risks. After a closer examination of two
case studies, we will return to this puzzle which remains anomalous without ref-
erence to the interaction context of Coreper.
The next section details two case studies: the 1994 local elections directive and the
1996 Helms-Burton countermeasures. Based on an “embedded case study” de-
sign (Yin 1994) and a strategy of “process tracing” (George 1979), my objective is
to document the bargaining sequence of each case to provide a more accurate im-
age of decision-making in the EU system. The local elections directive is a plausi-
bility probe to establish that Coreper does indeed handle highly political, sensi-
tive dossiers. But the local elections directive is also a “critical” case in the strict
methodological sense; it is a dossier invoking all the pathologies of a ‘joint-
decision trap’: a symbolic ‘high politics’ issue dealing with national citizenship
and electoral laws, subject to unanimous voting, and a contestable extension of
Community competence. If the hard bargaining image is accurate, we should see
it at work here. If, on the other hand, we find evidence for a community-method,
even in this ‘tough’ case, then we could reasonably expect to find similar evi-
dence in less politically charged and more routine cases.
The case of the Helms-Burton countermeasures illustrates Coreper’s role in the
broader context of the Council’s decision-making machinery: permanent repre-
sentatives are not omnicompetent problem-solvers, but they are instrumental
agents in the process of coordinating European level policies and reaching
agreement. Another signature case where the intergovernmentalist image would
expect to find hard bargaining and a lowest common denominator outcome,
Helms-Burton exemplifies a problem-solving approach to EU decision-making.
As I will show below, the EU countermeasures to US extraterritorial trade policy
depended crucially on the horizontal viewpoint and cross-pillar aggregration
functions of the permanent representatives.
                                                  
46 Interview, Brussels, March 1996.
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4 Coreper and the Community-Method: Two Cases
4.1 The 1994 Directive on the Right to Vote and Run for Municipal
Elections
At a December 19, 1994 meeting of the General Affairs Council, the Foreign Min-
isters formally adopted a directive on the right to vote and run for municipal
elections (94/80/EC) which had been solved twelve days earlier by the ambas-
sadors at the 1634th session of Coreper.47 This is a classic example of a “false B-
point,” or an A-point ‘disguised’ for political reasons as a B-point and rubber-
stamped by the ministers. What makes this a classic example is that negotiation
of the directive was engineered to “avoid Council” and kept exclusively at the
working group-Coreper levels. After Internal Market Commissioner Vanni
d’Archirafi introduced the proposed text48 to the General Affairs Council on
April 18–19, 1994 and two days later to Home Affairs, no ministerial discussion
took place again on this file. When it was sent back to the Council on December
19, unanimous agreement had already been reached in Coreper, including a deli-
cate ‘eleventh hour’ compromise on the subject of member-state derogations.
This case reveals Coreper does not deal merely in “non-controversial” matters.
The local elections directive covers extremely sensitive domestic political issues
related to electoral and citizenship laws. The directive grants EU citizens living in
another member-state the right to vote and run for office in municipal elections,
and establishes a principle of equal treatment between national and non-national
EU citizens.49 Implementation would require constitutional amendment in sev-
eral member-states, including: Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Italy,
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Austria. Clearly, this is the stuff of ‘high politics.’
But as mentioned above, one of the functions of Coreper is to handle files where
politicization risks are high and perceived as undesirable. During negotiations
                                                  
47 The full title is the Council directive “laying down detailed arrangements for the ex-
ercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citi-
zens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals” (OJ L
368/38, 31.12.94).
48 Com(94) 38 final, submitted to the Council on February 28, 1994.
49 For reasons of space, I have excluded coverage of the 1993 negotiations on detailed
arrangements for Article 8b(2) (TEU) which grants EU citizens residing in another
member-state the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European Parliamentary
elections, Council Directive (93/109/EC) (OJ L 329/34; 30.12.93). But the EP direc-
tive was also less contentious than the local elections case, supporting the latter’s
characterization as a critical case. It was widely predicted after the EP elections di-
rective was adopted that the local elections directive would be more controversial
and difficult to reach agreement on (e.g. Koslowski 1994: 389).
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under the German presidency of 1994, an Antici counsellor claimed instructions
clearly signaled the need to “keep it away from the press, where it would have
been politicized quickly.”50 Another explained, “We all knew that if the discus-
sion was put a certain way we never would reach agreement. Because of the
press, pressure from national populations, the idea that ‘We will be run by for-
eigners’….”51 A resident journalist in Brussels who followed this file told me, “It
was specifically dressed up as a B-point, but it was definitely an A-point. It was
felt that the ministers couldn’t contain this issue.”52
The local elections directive can claim a remarkably long shelf-life. Its origins
date back to the Paris Communiqué of 1974. Point 11 calls for a working party to
“study the conditions and the timing under which the citizens of the nine Mem-
ber States could be given special rights as members of the Community.”53 Fol-
lowing up on this, the Commission sent a report to the Council in July 1975
which argued the working group “should study the possibility of granting to
everyone at least the right to vote and stand for election at the municipal level.”54
In November 1976, Coreper was sent a report from the ad hoc working party on
special rights of citizens. The bulk of this document spelled out the problems
with granting Community nationals living in another member-state (referred to
as “Community foreigners”) “active voting rights” in local elections. In addition
to these problems, there was unanimous agreement that “the Treaties did not
provide an adequate legal basis for the adoption of an instrument on voting
rights. Only an instrument under international law or a Treaty amendment
would suffice.”55 This report was sent back to the group level, but “the delega-
tions spent most of their time outlining the political and legal difficulties … [this]
… would create in their country,” including the need for constitutional revision
(in six of the nine member-states).56 As a result, in June 1977, Coreper “did no
more than ‘take note’ of the report presented to it.”57 
Following rejection of another preliminary draft resolution prepared in 1979, the
file was placed in deep storage until the mid-1980s. Initially, these new discus-
sions also ran aground. The ad hoc group set up after the Fontainebleau Euro-
pean Council in 1984 (the Adonnino Committee) could only agree in their report
                                                  
50 Interview, Brussels, May 1996.
51 Interview, Brussels, April 1997.
52 Interview, Brussels, March 1997.
53 Bull. EC 12–1974, point 1104.
54 Bull. EC Supplement 7/75, 2.
55 Bull. EC Supplement 7/86, 11.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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approved at the 1985 Milan summit that voting rights and the eligibility to run
for local elections “falls within national jurisdiction.”58
The next important development was a request from the European Parliament for
a new Commission report on November 15, 1986. In this report, the Commission
provided systematic demographic statistics as well as the legal and political
status of voting rights for non-nationals in each member-state.59 It was estimated
that four million Community nationals were living in another member-state, and
as such, were “disenfranchised in local elections by virtue of living in a Member
State other than their own.”60 The report led to a Commission proposal in 1988
for a directive on voting rights for Community nationals in local elections.61
Although this proposal would resurface and serve as a partial template in the
Maastricht negotiations on citizenship, one group member claimed, “The 1988
draft never got far because at the time it was very questionable for Community
competence in this field.”62 But at least one Antici counsellor who worked on this
file in 1988 and 1989 detected new impetus behind this dossier. Specifically, “The
working group level discussions went well. There was almost agreement on the
text, but some really key questions needed to be addressed still.”63 Following an
initiative by the Spanish presidency, the topic of voting rights for Community
nationals was placed on the agenda of the January 23, 1989 General Affairs Coun-
cil.64 Negotiations continued to gather momentum. A member of the Belgian
delegation recalled:
In 1990, this file went from the working group to Coreper and then to the Coun-
cil. The result was an agreement in principle, but the political problems were still
not solved. What happened was they stopped negotiations at Council and agreed
to take the issue up in the IGC.65
According to the Council press release, the Foreign Ministers discussed this topic
at their June 18–19 meeting, but noted “political, constitutional and legal prob-
lems in connection with this proposal which prevent certain Member States from
taking up a final position.”66
                                                  
58 Ibid.: 14.
59 Bull. EC Supplement 7/86.
60 Ibid.: 5. In the Commission’s 1994 proposal (COM (94) 38 final), this estimate was
five million. See also, Koslowski (1994).
61 COM(88) 371 final.
62 Interview, national capital, March 1997.
63 Interview, Brussels, April 1997.
64 Press Release. Council of the European Communities, General Secretariat. 4163/89
(Presse 4).
65 Interview, Brussels, February 1997.
66 Press Release. Council of the European Communities, General Secretariat. 7258/90
(Presse 98).
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So it was only under the auspices of the Maastricht negotiations and the political
consensus to give substance to the chapter on European citizenship that the right
to vote and run for local elections was finally accepted.67 As a result of the Treaty
deadline, there was considerable time pressure during the German presidency of
1994 to reach agreement on the detailed secondary legislation. As one group-level
participant explains,
This was a big step for most member-states, but because of the deadline, discus-
sions were kept going. It was essential to have lots of meetings to keep the
rhythm going. It would have been very difficult for one member-state to sign for
it at Maastricht and then veto it. [But] the real danger was that it would be post-
poned and negotiations would advance very slowly.68
In order to understand how the timing and political acceptance of voting rights
for Community nationals differed from previous failed attempts, the ‘grand bar-
gain’ and package-deal of Maastricht must be taken into account. As do subse-
quent time pressures to agree on arrangements detailing Article 8b(1) by the De-
cember 31, 1994 deadline. But a third critical factor was that detailed arrangement
negotiations were injected into Coreper. Without recourse to the community-
method found in Coreper, this directive would have looked very different if it
had been adopted at all.
The critical litmus-test for this counterfactual argument is the handling of the
derogations stage. Derogation discussions were initiated at the group-level, be-
ginning in the Fall of 1994, but this was for trouble-shooting, not negotiation.69
The German presidency employed the group to discuss derogations at a technical
level (i.e. demographics, etc.). But derogation negotiations only began to take
place in Coreper in late October.
The ambassadors first discussed derogations at length on October 19. At this
time, several were under instruction to seek special consideration, although the
packaging and presentation of these “special problems” would only be played
out over the next seven weeks. In particular, six member-states claimed difficul-
ties: Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, and Belgium (see table 1).
                                                  
67 The relevant Treaty Article is 8b(1), which reads: Every citizen of the Union residing
in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to
stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides,
under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised
subject to detailed arrangements to be adopted before 31 December 1994 by the
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consult-
ing the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations
where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.
68 Interview, Brussels, March 1997.
69 Interview, Brussels, April 1997.
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Table 1 Derogation Arguments for the 1994 Local Elections Directive
Nature of Problem Received
Understanding
Compromise Reached
Luxembourg 30% of electorate are non-
national EU citizens
Yes Article 12(1). Can establish
minimum residency require-
ments for non-national EU citi-
zens, not to exceed the term
length of the local office in
question (to vote) and twice the
term length to stand as candi-
date
Denmark All foreign nationals can vote in
local elections after meeting a
residency requirement of 3
years; Community nationals
should still be required to meet
this requirement
No Danish nationals are not subject
to this requirement; would vio-
late the principle of equal treat-
ment between all EU citizens
France Certain local offices participate
in the Collège des grands
électeurs sénatoriaux, and have
powers to elect delegates to the
parliamentary assembly
Yes Article 5(4). Allows additional
restrictions on local offices
designating delegates who vote
in or elect members to the par-
liamentary assembly
In municipalities where over 20%
of voters are non-national EU
citizens, only 20% of the seats in
the local assembly should be
held by such nationals
No Violates the principle of equal
treatment, and the restriction of
posts to own nationals in Article
5(3)
Greece Desired extension of the Lux-
embourg derogation to the local
level
No Exemptions should be as re-
stricted as possible and are not
applicable to local government
units; the Luxembourg deroga-
tion applies to the national level
Austria Desired extension of the Lux-
embourg derogation to the local
level
No Exemptions should be as re-
stricted as possible
Belgium Territorial division of electorate
into linguistic communities
Yes Article 12(2). Can restrict appli-
cation of directive to certain
communes, a list of which must
be published one year before
elections are held
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Luxembourg already had support for a derogation, and discussion reiterated
only why this was justified. Even the earlier 1988 Commission proposal recog-
nized the need for exemptions in a member-state where the proportion of non-
national Community residents is 30 percent of the total electorate.70 It should be
noted that the Luxembourg derogation was raised at the second working group
meeting on April 15 (under the Greek presidency), and consensus already ex-
isted.71 The wording of the derogation covers a member-state where non-national
EU citizens form more than 20 percent of the total electorate, effectively limiting
the exemption to Luxembourg (i.e. the 20 percent threshold is not applicable to
individual municipalities within member-states). However, this derogation cre-
ated a precedent other delegations would try to extend to their own “special”
problems.
Denmark, for example, already allowed all foreign nationals the right to vote in
local elections after a minimum residency of three years. They pushed for the ex-
tension of this requirement to non-national EU citizens as a special clause to the
directive. This reservation remained on the agenda and was discussed as late as
the Coreper II meeting on December 2. But few delegations supported a fixed
residency requirement, under the logic that Danish nationals were not subject to a
similar restriction and this violated the principle of equal treatment between na-
tional and non-national EU citizens. Unable to convince the others this deroga-
tion was warranted, the Danish delegation dropped their reserve and accepted
the directive as it stood.
France requested a derogation stemming from special problems in municipalities
where mayors have sovereign powers to elect Senate delegates. The argument
heard in Coreper was that the French Senate amended the constitution to allow
EU citizens the right to vote and run for local elections subject to reciprocity (Ar-
ticle 88–3), but they also added to that clause: “Such citizens may not perform the
duties of mayor or deputy mayor or participate in the designation of senatorial
electors and the election of senators.”72 In other words, the French wished to ex-
clude municipal offices with independent powers in Senate elections from
thescope of the directive. On this score, they received support and understanding
in Coreper. The rationale for accepting the derogation was that Article 8b (TEU)
clearly delimits the scope of voting and participatory rights to the municipal
level.73
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However, the French also proposed to restrict the directive’s scope by limiting
the number of local seats open to non-national EU citizens in specific municipali-
ties. In October, under pressure from Paris, and the political signals being sent
from the Senate, the French delegation argued to add a clause limiting the num-
ber of seats open to other member-states’ citizens to 20 percent in municipalities
where over 20 percent of the electorate are non-national EU citizens.74 In effect,
this would extend the Luxembourg derogation to the local level. Several delega-
tions entered scrutiny reservations. The Greek delegation showed early support
for the restriction. But the majority was not in favor of this ‘quota system’ because
it violated the spirit of the principle of equal treatment and the implicit under-
standing that restrictions under Article 5 of the directive should not be so broad
as to enable a member-state to extend exemptions to all the seats on a local coun-
cil.75 In the end, it was agreed this derogation would result in a patchy imple-
mentation of the directive, severely restrict its scope and application, and render
the Treaty’s objective of endowing EU citizenship with distinct rights a hollow
shell. The French ambassador, under instruction, kept this reservation in place
right up until the end, when it was dropped after the lunch session of Coreper II
on December 7.
Greece and Austria had a harder time generating understanding for an exemp-
tion. In fact, both arguments were torpedoed in Coreper, one implicitly and one
explicitly. Greece raised their concern at the working group level by stating, “We
would have problems in certain municipalities … but this is for political consid-
eration.” In the informal bilateral discussions which followed, the Greek delega-
tion raised what one group member described as “Their hypothetical concern
that they could have the future obligation to give Turkish citizens the right to
vote.”76 Another participant recalled, “The Greeks felt they had a problem, but
this did not get much understanding in the group or in Coreper. Their problem
was forward-looking and hypothetical. They wanted the 20 percent derogation
extended to individual municipalities, and their argument was that if Turkey
ever became an EU member they would have several local communities which
would be affected.”77 While Greece strongly supported the French proposal for a
‘quota system’, they never came out and made an argument for their derogation
needs in Coreper. Perhaps aware their argument lacked persuasive power, they
quietly dropped their reserve along the way, and the addition of a review proce-
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dure enabling the Commission to propose “appropriate adjustments” may have
been a face-saving device for Athens.
A similar hypothetical concern was raised by the Austrian delegation, which did
receive explicit rejection in Coreper. “They were afraid of how the directive
would be accepted internally,” a group representative recalled, “They are afraid
of extreme Right movements and they have a high standard of living so it was
not easy to explain to them the advantage of the directive.” They were also initi-
ates to the practices of a community-method. The Austrian Ambassador pressed
for a special derogation twice at the level of Coreper. The first time, no one said
anything in reply. “We just sat there and listened,” a participant recalled, “[Ger-
man Ambassador] Von Kyaw waited to see what would happen. But the second
time Austria raised the issue, Von Kyaw was very rough to the Austrian Perma-
nent Representative. The Austrian Ambassador said in Coreper, ‘What is the
logical argument why you cannot accept our case?’ Von Kyaw replied very
sharply, ‘We are here meeting very pragmatically, I don’t have to explain the
logical case to you.’ He said this very rough and it was the last we heard of the
Austrian derogation.”78
The final “special” problem was raised by Belgium, which proved to be the true
endgame of derogation negotiations. Strategically, the Belgian delegation waited
to present their case until the others’ arguments had been heard. The Danes were
unable to garner support for a fixed residency requirement. The French had
worked out a satisfactory wording to limit the directive’s scope, but justification
for their ‘quota-system’ was unconvincing. The Greeks “had almost forgotten
their problem.”79 And the Austrian argument had been rejected. One ambassador
recalled the issue with Belgium was “How to accept the Belgium problem with-
out opening the Pandora’s box of Treaty revision?” “We were able to do it in
Coreper,” he added, “but it would have been difficult to do in a crowded, me-
diacized General Affairs Council.”80
Essentially what happened was the Belgian Ambassador requested a restricted
session to clear the room and said, ‘We will need constitutional changes to trans-
pose this directive and the Flemish Chamber will not accept it without a deroga-
tion.’ His ability to speak frankly and seek understanding from his colleagues
was based on a culture of compromise and a mutual responsiveness to accept
domestic political constraints. And unlike the other failed attempts for member-
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state derogations, the Belgian problem was supported by a good argument. As a
member of the Belgian delegation explained:
We knew that the members of Coreper knew the Belgian situation. They live
here, they hear the radio, read the news, and they understand our domestic po-
litical problems. The ambassadors did not need a detailed explanation to justify
the derogation to their capitals because they already understood the problem.
Sometimes in Coreper there is a lot of understanding without a lot of words … .
Included in the derogation was a guarantee to the other member-states that it
would be as limited a derogation as possible … Ambassador de Schoutheete ac-
tually asked for a closed derogation, not an open one. And this is something
ministers do not want to discuss. The Belgian Minister would have had to explain
the Belgian situation in the Council and the ministers would not understand.81
It is significant that the Belgian derogation was settled over lunch at the Decem-
ber 7 session of Coreper where the ambassadors could again meet in restricted
session and speak frankly. Before restarting Coreper after lunch, the ambassadors
telephoned their foreign ministers to explain the agreement reached. They em-
phasized the Belgian derogation was necessary and an acceptable solution was in
hand. A participant described the reports back home as follows: “The concessions
we agreed on were accepted in the capitals as the bottom-line, after a series of
long telephone discussions.”82
In summary, this case illustrates the problem-solving capacity of Coreper and
their influence in handling a sensitive political file which included a tricky bal-
ancing act of delivering the goods at home and collectively. While this was a
dramatic case supporting my argument that the bargaining style of Coreper is
embedded in an atmosphere of frank discussion, thick trust, and a shared com-
mitment to finding solutions, it is also a critical case to understand Coreper’s role
in making a success of the Council through the production of a distinct commu-
nity-method.
4.2 The 1996 Helms-Burton Countermeasures
When EU blocking legislation to the United States Helms-Burton Act was for-
mally adopted as an A-point at the November 22, 1996 meeting of the Fisheries
Council, five months of intense negotiation and transatlantic brinkmanship had
culminated into a successful case of collective problem-solving at the European
level. Unlike the case of the local elections directive, the EU response to Helms-
Burton was not settled quietly in Coreper, but processed at multiple levels of the
Council machinery and resolved only in the margins of a General Affairs Council
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on October 28. But as this case will reveal, Coreper’s input and packaging of the
response was instrumental for collective EU action. 
The “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act,” better known as
the Helms-Burton Act, was signed into law on March 12, 1996 by US President
Bill Clinton.83 Ostensibly, his endorsement was precipitated by the desire to
tighten the existing US embargo on Cuba in response to the shooting down of
two small US civilian aircraft in international waters by Cuban military jets on
February 24, 1996. Prior to this incident, President Clinton did not support
Helms-Burton and was on record saying he would veto the bill if it ever reached
his desk (Lowenfeld 1996: 419).84 Designed to reinforce existing US legislation to
isolate Cuba, Helms-Burton amalgamates existing embargo regulations into one
statute. There are four main provisions. Title I reaffirms and extends the restric-
tions of the embargo, for example, by prohibiting indirect financing through in-
ternational financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Title II
details provisions by which the US will provide assistance to a free and inde-
pendent Cuba. This is a detailed section, listing the necessary conditions before
Cuba can be considered democratic, as well as the types of assistance the US is
willing to provide.
The remaining two provisions are the fundamental source of international con-
troversy. The main extraterritorial component of Helms-Burton is Title III, which
enables US citizens whose property was confiscated after the 1959 Cuban revolu-
tion to sue foreign companies currently benefiting from this property. Claimants
may recover damages equal to the value certified by the US Foreign Claims Set-
tlement Commission or the fair market value, plus legal costs. President Clinton
agreed to sign Helms-Burton after negotiating with Congress the right to suspend
the Title III provision allowing lawsuits. The terms of the Title III waiver require
renewal every six months, and the right to sue foreign companies is retroactive
from November 1, 1996 if the suspension is ever lifted. The Final Title, Title IV,
holds that foreign nationals found “trafficking” in confiscated property can be
denied entry into the US. Trafficking is defined very broadly, to include the buy-
ing, selling, transferring, or leasing of expropriated property, as well as “engag-
ing in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated prop-
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erty” (Section 4(13)) (cited in Lowenfeld 1996: 424). Some estimate as many as
1,300 companies have investments in Cuba which constitute “trafficking” as de-
fined in Helms-Burton (Lowe 1997: 381).
International opposition to Helms-Burton was swift and widespread, led by the
EU, Canada, Mexico, and the Organization of American States (OAS). US trading
partners were infuriated by the possibility of US nationals making expropriation
claims on foreign owned companies in US courts as well as the anticipation ef-
fects this legislation could have on future investment opportunities in Cuba. But
the biggest outrage was political: In effect, Helms-Burton attempts to internation-
alize the unilateral US embargo on Cuba.
The EU response to Helms-Burton would ultimately coalesce into a two-text for-
mulation: a Council Regulation (2271/96/EC) and a Joint Action (96/668/
CFSP).85 The stated aim is to protect against the effects of the extraterritorial
application of legislation adopted by a third country. As a legal instrument, the
Helms-Burton countermeasures are particularly interesting because of their
horizontal nature covering all three pillars. Pillar one coverage includes external
commercial relations with the United States and Cuba. Pillar two aspects include
transatlantic relations with the United States generally, and the promotion of
liberal democracy abroad more specifically. And pillar three is implicated
through the issue of visas policy and the jurisdiction of national courts in civil
matters. As we shall see, maintaining the boundaries between pillars is not
unproblematic; one of the trickiest aspects in drafting the blocking measures was
to avoid the competencies of pillars two and three from being imported into a
Community regulation governed by the first pillar.
The first ministerial discussion of the Helms-Burton Act took place at the General
Affairs Council on April 22, 1996. The Foreign Affairs Ministers raised the possi-
bility of adopting countermeasures to Helms-Burton and the need to press this is-
sue as a high priority within the framework of the transatlantic dialogue.86 But it
wasn’t until the July meeting of General Affairs, following the Florence summit,
that specific countermeasures were elaborated.
At the Florence summit on June 21–22, Helms-Burton was discussed by the
Heads of State and Government, and the communiqué issued a sharp message to
the US: “The EU asserts its right and intention to react in defence of the EU’s in-
terest in respect to this legislation and any other secondary boycott legislation
which has extra-territorial effects.”87 At this time, the European reaction was one
of deterrence. Retaliatory actions were considered premature. Aside from men-
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tioning a possible request for a dispute settlement panel at the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), the lack of discussion of specific EU counter-legislation was
tangibly evident at Florence.88
Following Florence, weekly discussions in Coreper II focused on preparation for
the July General Affairs Council. The ambassadors recognized this as the last
Council before the August holidays to get a concrete set of EU countermeasures
on the bargaining table.89 The Commission also went on the offensive in prepa-
ration for the July Council. On July 12, Commission President Jacques Santer sent
a letter and explanatory memorandum to President Clinton, formally requesting
suspension of Title III provisions by July 15. He added that Clinton’s decision to
suspend Title III would affect the EU’s response, which involved the “active con-
sideration of retaliatory measures such as entry restrictions, freezing of assets,
‘claw back’ suits in foreign courts to reclaim amounts awarded in the US, and the
application of blocking statutes to prevent the application of the US law.”90 But
the General Affairs Council was scheduled to meet on Monday, July 15 and
Clinton would not make a decision until consulting his advisors on Tuesday, July
16.91 As the Commission’s main interlocutor in Coreper II, Deputy Secretary-
General Carlo Trojan worked closely with the ambassadors to prepare arguments
against Helms-Burton and potential EU responses.
There was an undeniable element of brinkmanship at work here. On Monday,
Jacques Santer opened the debate in the General Affairs session, calling on the
ministers to “react and react today,” since “it is more than likely that the United
States will confirm application of the Helms-Burton Law in its entirety.”92 The
Council conclusions included the possibility of enacting four specific counter-
measures:
1. Initiating dispute settlement proceedings at the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
2. Adopting blocking legislation to counteract the extraterritorial effects of US
legislation.
3. Enacting visas restrictions on the entry of US businessmen into the EU.
4. Establishing a watch list of US companies filing Title III actions.
It was also at this meeting that the Foreign Affairs Ministers gave Coreper a po-
litical green light to develop the EU response. The Council authorized Coreper to
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“make the necessary preparations for urgent Community and coordinated na-
tional action.”93
To orchestrate these four retaliatory measures, the ambassadors began extensive
weekly discussions on the EU response to Helms-Burton. On July 17, President
Clinton suspended Title III for six months. On July 18, at the weekly meeting of
Coreper II, the main agenda issue was Helms-Burton. The ambassadors’ discus-
sion centered on the significance of Clinton’s suspension of Title III and how to
follow-up Monday’s General Affairs Council conclusions regarding the EU
countermeasures. Consensus existed on two points. First, President Clinton’s six
month suspension was only a partial solution. Regardless of the waiver, the right
to sue under Title III was retroactive from November 1, 1996 any time the waiver
was lifted or expired. The threat of pending lawsuits in US courts created a
strong disincentive for current and future business ventures and investment into
Cuba by European companies. And Title IV actions to deny targeted business ex-
ecutives entry to the US could not be suspended.
Second, the ambassadors agreed that Clinton’s decision did not modify the con-
clusions reached at Monday’s Council.94 The French ambassador was particularly
outspoken for coordinated EU action, supported with strong statements from the
Belgian, Italian, and German ambassadors as well.95 They agreed to emphasize in
their reports the need to keep up pressure on Washington. In several cases, these
written reports were followed up with direct phone calls to their Foreign Affairs
Minister.96 By underlining the recommendation to coordinate a European re-
sponse and packaging the viewpoints and preferences of their colleagues (i.e. they
were serious, they could deliver their government’s approval of specific coun-
termeasures) the ambassadors began a strategic campaign to deliver a collective
agreement on a set of EU countermeasures.
The ambassadors tried early on to find agreement on third pillar measures. One
idea was floated to enact visa restrictions on US business executives. The discus-
sion, at a restricted session, centered on the possibility of requiring immigration
and entry forms on all transatlantic flights into the EU, as a way of enacting mir-
ror legislation to Title IV of Helms-Burton.97 As one ambassador commented, “It
would be quite a step! Each American coming over would have to fill out a form
saying they had no case against an EU firm.”98 The ambassadors also held de-
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tailed discussions on the status of the Commission draft proposal for presentation
to the Ministers early in the Fall.99 And they agreed on the importance of working
closely with the Article 113 Committee to base the possible request for a WTO
panel on solid legal arguments.100 Carlo Trojan packaged this discussion into his
report to the Commission that member-states backed a strongly worded Com-
munity regulation.101
Several ambassadors believed the July 15 conclusions would have a deterrent ef-
fect on the pending Congressional vote on the D’Amato Bill.102 This became an
important subplot in the Helms-Burton dispute. The D’Amato Iran-Libya Sanction
Act (Ilsa) targets new investments in Iran and Libya’s gas and oil industries over
$20 million by authorizing a range of sanctions against foreign companies in-
vesting in these energy markets. The potential economic implications of D’Amato
is greater for EU member-states than Helms-Burton because of their dependence
on imported oil. The EU imports 80 percent of their oil, of which 20 percent
comes from Libya and Iran. And the EU accounts for two-thirds of Libya’s total
oil exports and one-third of oil from Iran.103 Several EU companies have large in-
vestments in one or the other countries, including: France’s Elf and Total, Spain’s
Repsol, Petrofina of Belgium, Veba and Wintershall of Germany, and Italy’s Agip.104
Later that same week, the US Senate approved a draft version of the D’Amato
Act. And this was a revised, “hardline” version of D’Amato which strengthened
the range of sanctions against foreign investors.105 In short, the EU deterrent had
failed. The July 15 conclusions had no effect on dissuading the US Congress from
supporting the D’Amato Act. It was the approval of the D’Amato Act and the
wider application of new forms of US “aggressive unilateralism” being signaled
from the US Congress which marked a turning point in EU countermeasure ne-
gotiations.106
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It was also during this early period of discussing the four options that the EU
regulation almost met a sudden death. On July 24, the Commission was set to
approve the draft blocking statute at the weekly Cabinet meeting but held off a fi-
nal decision after Britain announced they would veto the proposal if it infringed
on British sovereignty. The British Foreign Office issued a statement that the
Commission proposal covers a “complicated legal area” which requires careful
scrutiny.107 And several other capitals including the Hague, Paris, Rome, and
Bonn had issued similar scrutiny reservations to their Brussels delegation.108 But
the stakes for a united EU response were simultaneously raised when President
Clinton approved the D’Amato Act on July 25. Just five days after the D’Amato
Act was approved, despite British misgivings, the Commission approved a final
draft proposal. And this proposal had been broadened beyond the narrow scope
of Helms-Burton, to include noncompliance and legal remedy for all pending and
future US extraterritorial legislation.109 The passage of the D’Amato Iran-Libya
Sanction Act reinforced the argument that a strong collective stance against
Helms-Burton was imperative to EU commercial and political interests.
The first meeting of the Foreign Ministers following the summer break was the
informal General Affairs Council in Tralee, Ireland on the weekend of September
7–8. The Foreign Ministers were briefed by Leon Brittan regarding his talks ear-
lier in the week with US envoy Stuart Eizenstat. The ensuing discussion centered
on the WTO option. The Ministers endorsed the Commission’s opinion that the
WTO option should not be ruled out, and that it constituted a major weapon in
the EU “arsenal” against the encroaching extraterritoriality of US law. But there
was also apprehension among the ministers that Helms-Burton could have nega-
tive repercussions on implementing the Transatlantic Agenda agreed at the 1995
Madrid summit. Overall, Tralee displayed a cautious approach by the Foreign
Ministers to avoid escalating the dispute and damaging long-term relations with
the US. At one point, Irish Foreign Affairs Minister Dick Spring, as acting EU
President, and Jacques Santer both intervened to argue that a request for a WTO
panel should be avoided until after the US presidential elections in November.110
What emerged from Tralee was an implicit understanding that the WTO option
should not be ruled out, but that not all member-states currently supported WTO
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action because of potential damaging repercussions for relations with the US.
There were differences of opinion regarding both the efficacy and the timing of
the WTO option. In fact, there is evidence the ministers downplayed the WTO
option at Tralee. Citing Commission sources, Agence Europe summarized the re-
sult of the exchange of views in Tralee as follows:
The EU must adopt as soon as possible the anti-boycott regulation … and it be-
lieves that the Council should approve the regulation in its session on 1 October
… if the regulation … and the other instruments that the EU is examining (e.g.
regarding Visas) are rapidly put together, the procedure before the WTO and the
creation of the panel become less urgent [emphasis added].111
The ambivalence of these conclusions by the ministers – the EU should respond
quickly, the EU needs to take a strong stance, the WTO option could damage re-
lations and the multilateral trading order – would in effect reinforce and expand
the negotiating mandate of the permanent representatives and the voice of their
recommendations back home.
At their weekly session following Tralee, the ambassadors spent most of the
morning session in restricted session to discuss the WTO option. Based on a re-
port from the Article 113 Committee, it was agreed a WTO challenge had a sound
legal basis. But there were political doubts as to the effectiveness of this option. A
participant at these discussions described the general climate as one of an
emerging consensus to proceed with a WTO panel, but there was some trepida-
tion this could undermine the fledgling WTO dispute machinery.112 And consis-
tent with Tralee, several member-states instructed the WTO option could lead to
an undesirable escalation of tensions with the US. The ambassadors weighed this
consideration carefully. But they were unsympathetic to the coincidence of WTO
proceedings with US elections. When I asked an Antici counsellor present at
these discussions how the US presidential elections factored into the timing of
initiating a WTO panel, he dismissed this consideration as “rubbish” and “of no
strategic importance to our deliberations.”113
The bigger risk was that if the EU proceeded to the WTO, the US threatened to
invoke a seldom used exemption on the grounds of national security. If the panel
accepted the US argument, this could be a major setback for the multilateral trade
regime and set a dangerous precedent for other countries to justify breaking
WTO rules. On the other hand, if the panel were to reject the US exemption, as
one trade diplomat hypothesized, the WTO “could be accused of over-riding a
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state’s sovereign right to define its national security interests. Given the current
mood of the Congress, that would be playing with fire.”114
But overall, dissatisfaction with the Clinton waiver and the pending D’Amato Act
justified the risk, and the WTO challenge would mark a decisive first step in the
countermeasures package. This was the collective understanding reached among
the ambassadors on September 12, an agreement which was then translated into
their reports and recommendations back home. In comparison to the ambivalent
stance taken by the ministers at Tralee, the October 1 decision to proceed with the
WTO option is hard to understand without taking into account this consensus
reached in Coreper. Throughout September, weekly discussions in Coreper con-
tinued regarding the partial suspension of Title III and the passing of the
D’Amato Act. Slowly, after lengthy discussions and numerous follow-ups at each
of the weekly Coreper II meetings in September, the decision to proceed with the
WTO panel was confirmed.
The formal decision to proceed with the WTO option was taken at the General
Affairs Council on October 1. Leon Brittan emerged from the meeting sounding
victorious. “What has happened today has shown the whole world that the EU
has the capacity to defend itself and the political will to do so. Respect grows
when people think that you can stand up for your interests.”115 But the October 1
General Affairs meeting also confirmed the unresolved issues in reaching agree-
ment on the blocking legislation. It was at this meeting that the two-text formula
of a regulation and a joint action was first announced. However, the details were
left vague and the ministers did not debate the form or legal basis of the blocking
legislation. As one participant recalled, “The ministers realized the requisite con-
sensus did not yet exist.”116 Instead, the Council conclusions instructed Coreper
to “conclude the work already underway,” and that “work should be taken for-
ward urgently so that the European Parliament can participate in the process of
the adoption of the Regulation …”117
Following the Council decision to proceed with the WTO option, Coreper discus-
sions of the blocking legislation became more focused. Settling the competency
question became the linchpin of reaching agreement. Because the Helms-Burton
response involved mixed competencies between the national and Community
levels, several delegations cited problems with a response in the form of a regu-
lation. In September, Paris signaled that perhaps the EU response should come in
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the form of a joint action. Initial arguments were floated at the working group
level, but this issue was quickly distilled to the permanent representatives for
consideration. This set into motion lengthy discussions in Coreper and numerous
bilateral conversations with the French ambassador and members of the Council
legal service.
The ambassadors agreed on the consequences if the French proposal was ac-
cepted: A joint action would result in an ineffective response. The ambassadors
were insistent in their reports this would be devastating. “We all knew that if it
would be an effective instrument,” a Committee member told me, “then it could
not be a joint action.”118 French Ambassador de Boissieu supported this hypothe-
sis, and forwarded this opinion back to Paris through a series of phone conversa-
tions with members of the SGCI. One member of the French delegation believes if
not for the personal interventions of Ambassador de Boissieu to convince Paris
that a joint action by itself would be ineffectual, this would have likely become an
non-negotiable least common denominator for the French.119
The two-text formula was discussed on numerous occasions in Coreper during
October, and from the permanent representatives’ perspective, became the only
solution possible. This should not be mistaken for a sub-optimal policy outcome
however. The two-text compromise is not a least common denominator outcome,
rather, it is a successful example of delivering the goods at home and collectively.
One participant described the compromise as follows, “At the insistence of the
French Ambassador’s instructions, it was agreed [in Coreper] the two-text for-
mula was necessary; without this formula, there could be no consensus.” But in
restricted session, several ambassadors also went on record saying they would
accept the two-text formula but had no intention of implementing the Joint Ac-
tion. The real “instrument” was the blocking regulation. As a member of the
Council’s legal service put it, “The Common Action was a magic formula for all
that was not covered by the regulation under the first pillar.”120 A Commission
participant in these negotiations summarized the compromise as follows: “The
blocking statute is largely a Community instrument with an ambiguously
drafted, minor third pillar agreement.” This implicit understanding reached in
Coreper became the backbone for consensus on a coordinated EU response.
The ambassadors were less successful on reaching agreement on other aspects of
the countermeasures package. The visas countermeasure ran into trouble in early
October, when the coordinating body for the third pillar, the K-4 Committee,
raised a number of objections. One ambassador told me, “We did not find in our
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legal instrumentations the kind of powers needed to do something here.”121 An-
other pointed out Coreper did not try to solve it because of lack of time and since
some permanent representatives are unwilling to “tread on the toes” of their K-4
directors. But he went on to say, “The ambassadors wanted the distribution of a
leaflet to be filled out on all airplanes, like the US does … there was agreement on
this. Not formal agreement, but a general feeling.”122
And, in mid-October, under pressure to reach agreement on the blocking legisla-
tion in time for the October 28 General Affairs Council, Denmark announced they
could not accept the legal basis of the Commission proposal. Kept quietly in the
background for weeks, the Danish reservation quickly came to the center of ne-
gotiations. The draft regulation was based on three Articles: 73c, 113, and 235.
Article 73c covers direct investment and the movement of capital to and from
third countries. Article 113 forms the basis of the EU’s common commercial pol-
icy. And Article 235 is the infamous ‘implied powers’ provision enabling Com-
munity action in new areas where necessary to attain objectives of the Treaty.
Denmark’s reservation was tied to a pending court case brought forward by a
citizens group arguing the Article 235 formula has created an unconstitutional
surrender of national sovereignty. Despite several attempts in Coreper to con-
struct a politically acceptable rationale for the legal basis that the Danish Foreign
Minister could endorse, there was no room for maneuver from Copenhagen. It
was principled objection to the Article 235 legal basis and Danish domestic poli-
tics, not disagreement over the desirability of a Community blocking statute
which created the shadow of the veto in this case. The ambassadors did discuss
ways to package the legal formula, but none of these were politically digestible to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the legal advisors of the Folketing’s European
Affairs Committee. Nor could the ambassadors agree on an alternative legal rem-
edy for the blocking legislation.
In short, the Danish reservation clearly indicates the limits of Coreper’s problem-
solving capacities. The member-governments sought to defuse the Danish reser-
vation and minimize the media exposure of this problem in the run-up to the
Luxembourg General Affairs Council by focusing discussions among the ambas-
sadors in Coreper, but the ambassadors themselves believed this could only be
resolved at the ministerial level.123
After a final failed attempt at the Coreper II meeting of October 24, the Danish
Ambassador, Poul Christoffersen, began to work virtually around-the-clock over
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the weekend to find a solution in time for the Luxembourg General Affairs Coun-
cil on Monday, October 28. His motivations to find a solution are revealing. The
pressure to reach agreement on a blocking regulation had become a serious Euro-
pean credibility issue. For Denmark to block agreement on a measure which they
supported because of their inability to accept the Article 235 formula put them in
a very undesirable position. After months of strong declarations against the US
law, the EU would lose credibility if they could not translate their objections into
an operational retaliatory instrument. Danish Ambassador Christoffersen felt this
pressure very strongly. During the weekend, in close concertation by telephone
with lawyers in Copenhagen and the Council legal service, a possible solution
began to emerge. But it was only at a meeting in the margins of the General Af-
fairs Council on Monday that a ‘creative solution’ was found.
On Monday morning, October 28, the Foreign Ministers opened their session
deadlocked over the Danish reservation. A small team of representatives from the
Danish delegation, the Commission, the Council Legal Service, and the Irish
Presidency met in one of the Presidency ‘confessional’ rooms to discuss the op-
tions. Denmark proposed the EU response come in the form of a Convention
based on Article 228, which covers rules for concluding agreements between the
Community and third states or other international organizations. But this alter-
native proposal was rejected by the others as too weak.124 It was then suggested
that Article 6 of the draft regulation, covering compensation for European com-
panies hit with Title III actions in US courts, be removed from the regulation and
transferred into a joint action. This would exorcise the third pillar component
governing the jurisdiction of national courts in civil matters from the Community
regulation. A final suggestion was a declaration in the minutes of the Council
meeting where the member-states, the Council legal service, and the Commission
state that in their view of the jurisprudence of the ECJ, recourse to Article 235
would not give the EU new powers in this case.125 None of these alternative pro-
posals were consensus-forming.
But a way out of this “technico-legal imbroglio”126 did emerge. The solution in-
cluded two components. First was a linkage to the 1968 Brussels Convention on
the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
This ameliorates the legal uncertainties of recognizing the connection to create
judicial competence in a Community regulation. As a participant in these discus-
sions put it, “This helped appease Denmark on the 235 formula. It was a gimmick
essentially and a face-saving measure.”127 The 1968 Brussels Convention gave the
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appearance that there was nothing ‘new’ in the blocking regulation. More im-
portantly, it provided political argumentation that new powers were not being
conferred to the EU. The second component was a rewording of the text to limit
the scope of the clawback clause. As a member of the Danish delegation ex-
plained:
This was the key advance, to limit the scope of the regulation to only regaining
money lost as a result of a claim from a US court decision. Originally, it was
extended to include the principle of compensation which could include compen-
sation for lost business opportunities. But this gets into civil matters which fall
under the jurisdiction of pillar 3 and our key objection was to not have a pillar 3
issue included in a regulation based on [Articles] 113 and 235.128
In summary, this case clearly shows that Coreper is not an omnipotent problem-
solver, and indeed, they were unable to overcome the legal doubts and political
sensitivities behind the Danish reservation. But overall, the permanent represen-
tatives played an instrumental role in orchestrating the cross-pillar implications
of this file and in placing pressure on the capitals to accept a united response to
the Helms-Burton Act. Despite the pathologies of joint decision-making, a coor-
dinated EU response to US extraterritorial law was achieved. Whether this was
an efficient response or a messy compromise based on complex legal formula and
mixed competencies is another matter. And while the Helms-Burton case is con-
sidered by many in Brussels as a success story of the post-Maastricht pillar sys-
tem, the precedent established for future cross-pillar endeavors and the degree to
which pillars two and three are evolutive structures remain to be seen.
5 Conclusion: Coreper as a Nucleus of Community
To summarize my critique of the intergovernmentalist image, I have argued two
components embodied in Coreper go undervalued and overlooked. First is the
combination of Coreper’s de facto decision-making role and their causal influence
and voice in the articulation of national preferences. And second is the collective,
communautaire dimension of this authority, expressed through the routinization
and diffuse exchange of viewpoints and a collective rationality which transcends
individual, instrumental rationality.
As the local elections case reveals, EU decision-making is not all about relative
power and instrumental interest calculations. Communicative rationality matters;
small states with good arguments can still win, as the Belgian derogation shows.
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The local election negotiations are also an example where self-interest maximiz-
ing calculations were soft-pedaled in the broader interest of reaching agreement.
Despite a number of delegations who failed to persuade the group for their dero-
gation needs – including Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria – there was none
of the sort of posturing you would expect to find in the confrontational style of
hard bargaining, such as threats of veto or quid pro quo concessions leading to a
lowest common denominator outcome and application of the directive.
And the case of the Helms-Burton countermeasures shows how collective prob-
lem-solving at the European level can overcome the frequently cited pathologies
of a ‘joint-decision trap,’ including the demanding consensus requirements and
threat of veto under unanimous voting.129 More surprising in this case, is the
finding that effective EU decision-making can occur in a policy-area steeped in
legal doubts with multiple cross-pillar implications, complex technical issues,
and mixed Community and national competencies. Following the recent work of
integration researchers such as Guy Peters (1997), this case supports an argument
that the presumption of the ‘joint-decision trap’ model to EU decision-making
does not have universal application, and indeed, may actually apply under more
restrictive and limited conditions than generally assumed. This case also suggests
that in the multileveled, multipillar complexities of contemporary EU decision-
making, Coreper is an important institutional mechanism in the machinery of the
Council which can help avert the “traps” of collective decision-making at the
European level.
These cases also show how the formal decision-rule is an indeterminate measure
to predict bargaining outcomes. The instinctive recourse to behave consensually
and the responsibility to find collective solutions appear to have as much causal
significance in the decisional process as the rule of unanimity and the shadow of
the veto. Even more indeterminate in understanding EU decision-making are
quantitative estimates of the output of the Council according to A- and B-points.
The local elections directive, formally a B-point, was merely rubber-stamped by
the ministers after agreement was reached in Coreper; whereas the Helms-Burton
blocking legislation was formally adopted by the Council as an A-point, but
hinged crucially on political mandation by the ministers.
I have also argued Coreper is a key site in the production and maintenance of a
community-method, characterized by a dynamic process of l’engrenage, a shared
mutual purpose to understand each others problems, and a culture of compro-
mise which results in a unique style of bargaining and context of interaction.
However, this should not to be mistaken with the oft-cited affliction of “going
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native.” My research points to a development more subtle and difficult to define.
Very simply, the affliction of “going native” only makes sense where the cogni-
tive boundaries between the national and Community levels are clearly separable
and sharply drawn. But it is exactly at this interface between the national and
Community levels that Coreper exists. In effect, the cognitive boundaries be-
tween the two levels have become blurred.130 My argument is that what makes
Coreper interesting as an institutional interface is that the permanent representa-
tives have to manage this tension between the Community and national levels on
a day-to-day basis. Or in more general terms described by Joseph Weiler (1991:
2480), they are actors “fated to live in an uneasy tension with two competing
senses of the polity’s self, the autonomous self and the self as a part of a larger
community”.
And while I agree with Weiler’s (1994) categorization of supranationality as a
foundational ideal (among others), and share his reading that this ideal has not
fared well in the wake of Maastricht, my research on Coreper detects a weak yet
discernible nucleus of community which still subscribes to this ideal. What reso-
nates overall from my interview data is that Coreper is not only responsible for
processing the bulk of EU legislation, but shares a collective responsibility to
maintain the output and performance of Council as a whole.
The importance of supranationality as an ideal and a value, as Weiler also points
out, is that it “replaces a kind of ‘liberal’ premise of international society with a
communitarian one: the Community as a transnational regime will not simply be
a neutral arena in which states seek to maximize their benefits but will create a
tension between the national self and the collective self” (Weiler 1991: 31). As I
have tried to show, Coreper is one of the few institutional sites of the EU system
where this tension between the national self and collective self, embodied in the
metaphor of the Janus face, results in a creative and pragmatic approach to col-
lectively solve problems and the long-term effects of this tension have created a
value in the survival and success of the system itself. Future empirical research to
document this tension should be of broader interest to international relations
scholars who study collective identity formation and transnational relations. To
date, this research agenda has focused on the capacity of states to develop multi-
ple social identities, collective identifications, and shared mutual purposes but
with very little attention to who the actual agents are that internalize and practice
these identities. Within the context of the EU system, the permanent representa-
tives are exemplars of who John Ruggie means by “entrepreneurs of alternative
political identities” (1993: 172).
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Finally, there is the question of durability. How robust is the value of suprana-
tionality in the EU? This question is ripe for further debate, exposing the interdis-
ciplinary nature of contemporary integration research and the rich potential for
exchange between political scientists, sociologists, historians, and lawyers.
Whether the foundational ideals of the Community/Union still matter, and how,
is open for debate. But if the value of supranationality is to survive coming
rounds of Treaty revision, enlargement, and de facto if not de jure variable geome-
try, as well as the growing administrative rivalries between different preparatory
committees over the competencies of pillars two and three, then Coreper will
need to maintain its privileged role in preparing the Council and providing the
“glue” which connects the Community and Union’s single institutional structure.
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